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Abstract 
Nodes intriguing element in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET) are predictable to hold to the rules stated by the 
routing protocol utilized in the network. Safe routing protocols endeavor to decrease the ill-effect of nodes under 
the control of malicious entities who intentionally violate the protocol.. There are so many generic tools which are 
universal for individual as well as organizations for customers to offer protection which comprises Antivirus, Ant 
spam, etc., and network securities have turn into important issue in MANET. Security is one of the major issues 
in the MANET particularly w.r.t. complexity and size of the network. The main focus of this survey is to discuss 
& represent special characteristics of security in MANET and also apply several of the solutions security threats 
within MANET network similar to intruder activities, tapping and integrity, MANET link layer and network layer 
operations w.r.t. information security etc) w.r.t. MANET network. This Survey paper also discusses different 
number of security scenarios of MANET, Attacks in MANET and IDS in MANET.  
Keywords: AODV, MANET, Network Security, IDS, Attacks 
 
1. Introduction 
The Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs), developed back in the 1990s, are one of the most important license-
exempt access network technologies nowadays. They allow data, voice and video communications over a wireless 
channel. A particular class of standards which has clearly dominated the market is the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE - 802.11) wireless LAN, also known as Wireless-Fidelity (Wi-Fi). These networks 
could operate in two modes; (i) infrastructure, which uses a wireless access point, and (ii) ad-hoc mode, which 
allows the creation of a self-configuring network consisting of mobile routers (for example laptops, smart phones) 
which are interconnected by wireless links. The latter are called MANETs [1] and their scope is to enable routing 
functionalities into the mobile nodes. A MANET, as described by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
MANET Working Group (WG), is a temporary or permanent autonomous network comprised of free roaming 
nodes intending to establish wireless communications in absence of network infrastructures. 
 
Fig.1: MANET Concept 
The main role of MANETs is to enable wireless and mobile communication services without using the 
expensive service-provider network and without having a previously set up infrastructure. The network in that case 
is decentralized and the mobile nodes must accomplish network activities (network discovery) and must deliver 
the messages to each other by acting as routers. Therefore, MANET devices are able to sense the presence of other 
devices, establish communication links among them and communicate information. Concept of MANET is shown 
in fig.1: 
It is also true that security has long been an active research topic in wire-line networks; but due to unique 
characteristics of MANET there are many challenges because of its self organizing behavior. These challenges are 
shared wireless medium, highly dynamic network topology, stringent resource constraints and open network 
architecture. It’s true that existing security solutions for wired networks do not directly apply to the Mobile Ad-
hoc Networks domain. MANET has so many objections w.r.t. wireless defense due to several of the following 
rationales:  
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1. The wireless network particularly responsible to attacks because of active eavesdropping to passive 
intrusive.  
2. Due to less faith in Third Party attaches, it is extremely difficult to organize or apply security systems.  
3. Generally Mobile gadgets have bounded calculation capacity and energy utilization functionalities which 
are weaker to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. It is also unable to run intense security algorithms which 
require lots of computations such as public key algorithms.  
4. Some of MANET’s characteristics such as infrastructure less and self-organizing, there are extra 
probability for Faithfull node to be compromised and open attacks on networks..  
5. It is complicated to differentiate between old routing and forged routing information because of node 
movement method. In node movement method it implements regular networking reconfiguration which 
generates more probability for attacks.  
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks is a kind of infrastructure less, self-organizing, and the most important multi-
hop network. By cause of its distributed and wireless environment there is an immense threat for system security 
inventors. Recently security complications in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks have adhere much consideration; the 
majority of the research attempts focusing on precise security regions, like securing routing protocols or 
establishing trust infrastructure or intrusion detection and response.  
One of the main characteristic of MANET’s w.r.t. security scheme opinion is the less clear line protection. 
In case of wired networks we have dedicated routers; which perform routing functionalities for devices however 
in case of MANETs are bothered every mobile node operates as a router and forward packets for other nodes. It is 
also true that the network channel is reachable equally to attackers as well as to network users. There is no finely 
described protocol or position where traffic from various nodes should be observed or entrance manages 
mechanism could be imposed. As a result of this there is no any protection method that divides internal network 
from the external network. As this mode the existing Mobile Ad-hoc Networks routing protocols, like Ad Hoc On 
Demand Distance Vector (AODV) [3] and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [2], and wireless MAC protocols, such 
as 802.11 [4], usually assumed to be trusted. As a result, an attacker could become a router and disrupt network 
operations.  
There are generally three major security services for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks: Authentication, 
confidentiality, integrity.  
• Authentication means accurate individuality is recognized to communicating authority.  
• Confidentiality means communication information is reserved safe from illegal access.  
• Integrity means communication is unchanged throughout the communication between two parties.  
Amongst all these security services, authentication is perhaps the most significant and difficult matter in 
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks since it is the bootstrap of the entire security scheme. Once authentication is attained in 
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks then confidentiality is just an issue of encrypting algorithm on the session by utilizing 
keys. These security schemes could be offered individually or in grouping, it only based on demands. 
Rest of the paper is organized as follow: section 2 explains about the existing routing protocols in MANET, In 
section 3 we describes different attacks of MANET, section 4 contains Intrusion detection system for MANET and 
finally we conclude our paper in section 5. 
 
2. Routing In MANET 
The MANET Working Group (WG) of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), formed in 1997, is currently 
leading the standardization activities for an appropriate Internet Protocol (IP) based routing protocol functionality 
for both static and dynamic wireless routing topologies. The establishment of the MANET WG has been a catalyst 
towards research in the field of MANET routing, sparkling the creation of several scientific forums and the 
publication of vast amount of scientific papers addressing related challenges and possible solutions. The protocols 
developed by the MANET WG are considered to be the most suitable routing approaches for implementation. In 
addition to well-known wireless networking problems, MANETs present researchers with several peculiar routing 
challenges as described in [5, 6, and 7]. Fig.2 represents routing protocols in MANET. 
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Fig.2: Routing Protocols in MANET 
There are three main MANET routing approaches as follows 
• Proactive MANET routing: The proactive routing approach, also known as table driven routing, consists 
of maintaining consistent and updated route information between all possible Source-Destination (S-D) 
pairs in the routing tables. Thus, routes between S-D pairs are always available reducing the latency in 
route establishment. Since a large amount of routing information is periodically disseminated and stored, 
the downside to such an approach is the high overhead of control packets and power consumption even 
when no data is being transmitted. Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) [8] is a very popular proactive 
protocol, and in fact it is used for most of the implementations currently considered by IETF. 
•  Reactive MANET routing: A reactive routing approach, also known as on-demand routing, establishes 
and maintains routes between S-D pairs when requested by the data source node. Although such an 
approach generates routing overhead only on-demand, it nevertheless requires added latency for route 
discovery before routes are established. The Dynamic Source Routing Protocol (DSR) [2] is a well-known 
reactive protocol that utilizes route discovery and route maintenance on-demand to route data from a 
source to a destination. The AODV (Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector) routing protocol [3] is another 
well-known reactive protocol. AODV uses an on-demand route discovery and maintenance algorithm for 
route establishment in unicast routing and it is based on a modified Bellman-Ford [9] algorithm. AODV 
attempts to improve DSR by maintaining routing tables at the nodes, thus data packets do not have to 
contain routes. Another reactive MANET routing protocol is the AOMDV (Ad-hoc On-Demand 
Multipath Distance Vector) [10]. The main property which distinguishes AOMDV from AODV is that it 
enables loop-free and mutually link-disjoint multiple paths to a destination of a communication path 
providing fault tolerance. AOMDV chooses an optimal path until this breaks. Alternative routes are 
cached and they will be called only when a link failure occurs. 
• Hybrid MANET routing: Hybrid MANET routing protocols use both reactive and proactive routing 
methods. There is also another classification of such routing protocols based on their zonal and converged 
characteristics. In zonal routing approaches, both reactive and proactive routing functionalities are used 
in different demarcated network areas. In converged approaches adaptively mechanisms are required to 
change protocol operation from reactive to proactive and vice versa. A novel MANET routing protocol 
called ChaMeLeon (CML) [11] is an adaptive hybrid routing approach that differs from previous 
protocols in that it does not maintain routing zones. Alternatively, CML operates in a converged approach 
that is optimally maintained using three phases of operation (Oscillation (O)-phase, Proactive (P)-phase 
and Reactive (R)-phase) while each phase has amplified features on top of the utilized flat routing 
mechanism that works in parallel to the traditional routing protocol. 
 
3. Attacks in MANET 
There are generally two protocols are used in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks, first is Link layer protocol that are used 
to supply connectivity among distinct mobile nodes in order to confirm one-hop connectivity by utilizing multihop 
wireless channels. Alternatively if node likes to expand connectivity to distinct multiple hops then MANET utilizes 
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network layer protocols. Second is a distributed protocol. In the coordination procedure distributed protocols 
classically suppose that every mobile node are cooperating w.r.t. communication but in reality this hypothesis is 
not achievable in hostile mobile networks situation since support is not imposed in MANET. The query occurs 
why? The simple cause is since malicious attackers disrupt protocol specification in order to disrupt network 
operations. 
A. Classification of Network Layer Attacks 
Network layer attacks could be classified in two major group, first is passive attacks and second is active attacks, 
as presented below in Figure 3 
 
Fig. 3: Classification of network layer attacks in MANETs. 
1) Passive Attacks: in Passive attacks the attacker doesn’t disrupt the function of the routing protocol but tries to 
search important information’s during the traffic analysis. This leads to the revelation of significant information of 
the network or nodes like the network topology, the identity of main nodes or the position of nodes. A few examples 
of passive attacks are given below: 
Eavesdropping 
Since the wireless connections are there in MANETs, any message posted by any node could be listened by all 
nodes equipped with a transceiver and inside the network, and if there is no any encryption is utilized then the 
attacker could obtain valuable information posted by sender node. The sender node and receiver node typically not 
aware about this type of attack has been happened. Even though in the majority cases eavesdropping are not 
measured to be as a severe attack, it could give very important information in several situations and then analyst 
have to be target on reducing it. Authors in [12] examined the danger of eavesdropping as a function of the 
broadcast range of the nodes and their geographical allocations. 
Traffic Analysis and Location Disclosure 
Attackers could eavesdrop to the traffic on wireless connections to determine the position of objective nodes by 
evaluating the message prototype, the features of the broadcasting and the quantity of information broadcasted by 
the nodes. For instance, in an arena situation, a huge number of network traffic usually streams to and from the 
control center. Traffic prototype study therefore permits an intruder to determine the commanding nodes in the 
MANETs. Though the information in a communication is protected by encryption, traffic evaluation could still be 
achieved to remove some valuable information. Even though passive attacks don’t directly influence the network’ 
functionality, in several MANET application developments, such as military communication etc., significant 
information discovery during traffic evaluation or simply eavesdropping could verify expensive. Examples of 
effort on evaluation and defense against these attacks could be established in [12] [13]. 
2) Active Attacks: In active attacks, intruders begin intrusive actions such as modifying, fabricating, 
injecting, forging or dropping information or routing packets, resulting in different disturbances to the network. A 
few of these attacks are reasoned by a solo action of an intruder and others could be reasoned by a series of actions 
by colluding intruders. 
Active attacks bother the procedures of the network and could be so severe that they could bring down 
the whole network or disgrace the network performance significantly, in denial of service (DoS) attacks. Therefore, 
authors have focused on active network layer attacks. Active attacks can be more classified into malicious packet 
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dropping attacks and routing attacks, as mentioned in Figure 3. 
Malicious Packet Dropping 
A path among a source node and a destination node in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks is established utilizing a route 
discovery procedure. Once this has been finished, the source node starts sending the information packet to the 
neighbor node along the path; this midway node identifies the next hop node towards the target along the 
established path and forwards the information packet to it. This procedure continues until the information packet 
reaches the destination node. To achieve the needed operation of a MANET, it is significant that intermediate nodes 
forward information packets for any and every source nodes. However, a malicious node may choose to drop these 
packets instead of forwarding them; this is recognized as an information packet dropping attack, or data forwarding 
misbehavior. 
In comparison to deliberately malicious behavior, in some cases nodes are unable to forward data packets 
because they are overloaded or have low battery reserves; alternatively the nodes may be selfish, for example 
saving their battery in order to process their own operations. Packet dropping attacks differ from black hole and 
grey hole attacks (see below) because there is no attempt to “capture” the routes in the network. 
Routing Attacks 
Both the reactive and proactive routing protocols are vulnerable to routing attacks because they route based on the 
assumption that all nodes cooperate to find the best path. Consequently, a malicious node could exploit the 
vulnerabilities of the cooperative routing algorithms and the lack of centralized control to launch routing attacks. 
In particular, the on-demand (reactive) MANET routing protocols, such as AODV [3] and DSR [2], allow intruders 
to launch a wide variety of attacks. 
In the following we give examples of how different intrusive activities could cause various attacks in 
MANETs, illustrating them with AODV as the routing protocol. 
Sleep Deprivation Attack 
Sleep deprivation (SD) [14] is a distributed denial of service attack in which an attacker interacts with the node in 
a manner that appears to be legitimate, but where the purpose of the interaction is to keep the victim node out of 
its power-conserving sleep mode. In [15] the authors consider an intruder that could cause SD of a node by 
exploiting the vulnerability of the route discovery process of the protocol through malicious route request (RREQ) 
flooding in the following ways: 
• Malicious RREQ Flooding 1: an intruder broadcasts a RREQ with a destination IP address that is within 
the network address range but there the corresponding node does not exist. This compels all the nodes to 
forward this RREQ because no one will have the route for this destination IP address. 
• Malicious RREQ Flooding 2: After broadcasting a RREQ an intruder does not wait for the ring traversal 
time, but it continues resending the RREQ for the same destination with higher TTL values. This is a 
significant denial of service attack when we consider the energy constrained operations of MANETs. 
Black Hole Attack 
Intruders could exploit the vulnerability in route discovery procedures of on-demand routing protocols, such as 
AODV and DSR, when a node requires a route towards the destination. 
The node sends a RREQ and an intruder advertises itself as having the fresh route. By repeating this for 
route requests received from other nodes, the intruder may succeed in becoming part of many routes in the network. 
The intruder, once chosen as an intermediate node, drops the packets instead of forwarding or processing them, 
causing a black hole (BH) [16] in the network. The way the intruder initiates the black hole attack and captures 
the routes may vary in different routing protocols. For example, in AODV, the destination sequence number 
(dest_seq) is used to represent the freshness of the route. A higher value of dest_seq means a fresher route. On 
receiving a RREQ, an intruder could advertise itself as having the fresher route by sending a Route Reply (RREP) 
packet with a new dest_seq number larger than the current dest_seq number. In this way, the intruder becomes 
part of the route to that destination. The severity of the attack depends on the number of routes in the network the 
intruder successfully becomes part of. 
Grey Hole Attack 
A grey hole attack (GH) [17] is a special case of the BH attack, in which an intruder first captures the routes, i.e. 
becomes part of the routes in the network (as with the BH attack), and then drops packets selectively. For example, 
the intruder may drop packets from specific source nodes, or it may drop packets probabilistically or drop packets 
in some other specific pattern. As we noted above, BH and GH attacks are different in nature from packet dropping 
attacks, where the attacker simply fails to forward packets for some reason. BH and GH attacks on the other hand 
comprise two tasks: the attacker first captures routes and then either drops all packets “BH attack” or some packets 
“GH attack” 
Rushing Attack 
In order to limit the control packet overhead, an on-demand protocol only requires nodes to forward the first RREQ 
that arrives for each route discovery. An attacker could exploit this property by spreading RREQ packets quickly 
throughout the network to suppress any later legitimate RREQ packets. For example, in AODV an intruder could 
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forge and forward a rushed RREQ, assigning a higher source sequence (src_seq) number to it; the intruder will 
also transmit the packet earlier than specified in the AODV protocol (this is the sense in which it is a “rushing” 
attack). This causes any later legitimate RREQ to be suppressed, and increases the probability that routes that 
include the intruder will be discovered instead of other valid routes. In [18] first described the rushing attack, and 
proposed its prevention through a set of generic mechanisms such as secure neighbor detection, secure route 
delegation and randomized RREQ forwarding. 
Sybil Attack 
Each node in a MANET requires a unique address to participate in routing, through which nodes are identified. 
However, in a MANET there is no central authority to verify these identities. An attacker could exploit this property 
and send control packets, for example RREQ or RREP, using different identities; this is known as a sybil attack 
(SY) [19]. This is an impersonation attack where the intruder could use either random identities or the identity of 
another node to create confusion in the routing process, or to establish bases for some other severe attack. 
In summary, we note that the motivation of intruders behind launching either packet dropping or routing 
attacks is to achieve a certain goal such as denial of service (i.e. making certain resources or services, such as 
applications, web access, printing, or routing, unavailable to the intended users). In addition, other goals of 
intruders might include partitioning the network, creating routing loops, discovering valuable information, or theft 
of resources. 
 
4. IDS for MANET 
Their self-configuring nature, open medium and lack of centralized control make MANETs vulnerable to a wide 
range of attacks. Encryption, authentication and other standard security techniques couldn’t provide full protection 
for MANETs. Therefore, intrusion detection mechanisms are highly recommended for these networks [20]. It is 
very crucial for the security of MANETs to have proactive defense mechanisms that could identify any anomalies 
before they could disrupt network operations. Conventional intrusion detection systems are designed for wired 
networks and couldn’t be directly applied to their wireless equivalents [21] [22]. The short comings of fixed 
intrusion detection systems are obvious because they require centralized entities to control the operations of 
monitoring, detection and reporting. MANETs by nature are deployed where no fixed infrastructure is required, 
thus making it unreasonable to expect centralized systems to be effective in such networks. 
With the wide-spread of mobile ad-hoc networks and their applications, it has become necessary to adapt 
to new dynamic security systems [23]. In the absence of a centralized authority for routing and monitoring, each 
node in the network acts as a host and a router. This makes MANETs highly susceptible to a wide range of attacks. 
These attacks could exploit the cooperative behavior of MANETs for their advantage [24]. Compromising a single 
node in the network could jeopardize the security of the whole network. 
Current IDS architectures for MANETs are divided into three main categories according to their 
implementation. These three types are: host-based IDS, distributed IDS and mobile agents IDS [25]. In host-based 
intrusion detection the IDS is deployed on each host (node) locally. Whereas in distributed IDS the functionality 
of the IDS is distributed among nodes where each node has a specific task or tasks. The third type use mobile 
agents that roam among nodes to detect and report anomalies. 
Host Based IDS 
Shakshuki et.al [26] proposed local IDS named Enhanced Adaptive Acknowledgment (EAACK) for MANETs. 
Their solution addresses some of the weaknesses of the Watchdog scheme, namely, false misbehavior, limited 
transmission power, and receiver collision. The IDS prevents attackers from initiating forged acknowledgment 
attacks by incorporating digital signature in every message. This proposal is based on the acknowledgment scheme 
in which the destination node (D) is required to send an acknowledgment packet back to the source node (S). 
To overcome the risk of attackers sending forged acknowledgment packets the authors proposed the use 
of digital signatures. All acknowledgment packets are digitally signed before they are sent out to be verified by 
the destination. The model also implements a mechanism to discover when a misbehavior report is initiated by an 
attacker to damage the operation of the network. When a node receives a report that another node is misbehaving 
it runs a verification scheme to confirm the report by sending a message to that node through an alternative route. 
One of the drawbacks in this solution is: it requires cryptographic keys to be distributed in advance but it does not 
propose any key exchange method. Another disadvantage is the fact that digital signatures introduce large network 
overhead which could be reduced using other cryptographic techniques. 
Distributed IDS 
Paramasiva and Pitchai [27] introduced a novel intrusion detection system that uses a game-theory based model to 
detect malicious nodes in the network. The authors used the Bayesian game concept to model the interaction 
between neighboring nodes of MANETs. In their paper, they described the interaction between a regular and 
malicious node as a 2 player dynamic non-cooperative game. Each mobile node is capable of monitoring, detecting 
and generating alarms in the case of an attack. The attack database and signatures are locally stored in each node 
along with system audit data, normal application profiles, and IDS logs. The network is divided into clusters and 
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a cluster head is elected through a clustering algorithm. The cluster head is responsible of updating normal behavior 
profile and attack signatures. The cluster head could also patch and install programs, analyze and diagnose 
anomalous nodes, and assess the local IDS running on other nodes in the cluster.  
If an intrusion is detected, the cluster head is notified by the decision making unit to make further 
diagnosis and analysis on that specific node. A prober action is taken and the compromised node is advertised 
across the network if and when the cluster head confirms the attack. This model promises to reduce the overhead 
introduced by running all the IDS functions on each single node. However, this proposal makes the assumption 
that one node is attacked at a time and that collusions between malicious nodes do not occur. The model also 
increases the power, and processing requirement on each node. 
IDS with mobile agents 
Stafrace and Antonopoulosb [28] proposed Mobile agents based IDS with military tactics for the detection of 
Sinkhole attacks in MANET [28]. The mobile agents are deigned to work as a tactical squad that conducts regular 
petrol missions through MANET nodes. Their approach is based on structured military command-base where 
agents get their instructions to police routes to detect any malicious activity. Some routes are patrolled more than 
others based on the a Sinkhole attack in (WSN) using the Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) as routing 
protocol. Calculated risk The model was tested through simulation of a Sinkhole attack in (WSN) using the Ad-
hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) as routing protocol. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
MANETs are gaining more and more solid ground in wireless communications. As the applications increase rapidly, 
threats and security issues also increase. In a wireless environment, security is a vital building block. Insecure 
wireless networks, are simply unusable. In this paper, we have introduced a short review of the most common 
threats and attacks. Mitigation techniques of the threats were also discussed. A few common types of attacks on 
MANET along with three different classifications of attacks on MANET security were presented. Attacks were 
discussed in the scope of these classifications along with their counter-measures. 
The characteristics of MANET make it a target for types of attacks that are not possible on other types of 
wired and/or wireless networks. For example, having constrained battery life makes its vulnerable to battery-
draining attacks like DoS. Also, being a wireless network makes it inherently vulnerable to jamming attacks that 
could render the complete wireless network unusable. Attacks aimed at the routing process have proved to be 
effective in disturbing the network operation. Attacks like wormhole, tunneling, and DoS have proved their 
effectiveness against almost all MANET routing protocols. 
Active attacks are considered more dangerous as they disrupt the proper operation of the MANET. While 
passive attacks are not necessarily harmful as standalone attacks, they could be used as a first step to more serious 
and harmful attacks like blackhole attacks. Thus, passive attacks should not be overlooked or ignored. 
Research in MANET security is diversified as the sources of threats are diversified. A good direction in 
research would be the creation of a trust-based system in which the type and diversity of security techniques 
applied rely on the level of trust. Although some research was done in this direction, specifically in terms of routing 
protocols, it is still a fresh area with high potential. 
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